

10 May 1993




FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
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# JPRS Report—

## Proliferation Issues

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2



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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

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10 May 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## SOUTH AFRICA

### Vice Admiral on 'Defensive' Chemical, Biological Warfare

MB2503144493 Pretoria PARATUS in English Mar 93  
pp 30, 31

[Article by Vice Admiral A.G. Malherbe, chief of Staff Logistics: 25 "Chemical and Biological Warfare"]

[Text] The field of defensive Chemical and Biological Warfare [CBW] is a relatively new one for the South African defence industry. Prior to 1985, the SA defensive CBW ability consisted only of some stockpiles of outdated equipment, and limited training using manuals and information based on old defensive CBW doctrine.

However the threat of chemical warfare appearing during the Angolan conflict over the period 1985 to 1989 changed that situation, and an intensive effort was made to update an international understanding of the field and to equip South African soldiers to cope with the threat.

Rapid progress was made, resulting in the establishing of advanced equipment testing abilities, coupled to research and development expertise and, finally, the fielding of a variety of defensive systems.

The South African defensive CBW project was divided into the traditional areas of protection, detection, decontamination and medical support. In each area of technology, a survey was made of the best international developments, followed by own evaluation of the most suitable options. A facility capable of laboratory scale synthesis of threat agents was established, and a "hot-testing" philosophy followed.

All South African equipment is tested against actual CW aggressors according to international standards, as well as using locally developed standards and test methods aimed at achieving more practical and useful results than many traditional methods.

A vital feature of the research and development work has been the close-operation of a multi-disciplinary development team and the end-users. Early in the process of equipment evaluation in typical local climatic conditions, it was realised that the use of protective systems can be a burden as important as the chemical threat itself.

It became critical to adopt a development approach which combined technical and equipment related expertise with human performance evaluation abilities, to incorporate resulting products into a defensive doctrine uniquely developed to take the defensive burden into account.

It was found that typical international defensive CBW doctrines incorporating a "low risk-high protection" philosophy were impractical for Southern African circumstances, and an approach was developed more suitable for the prevailing semi-tropical conditions of the Southern African military theaters.

In particular, the Cuban/Soviet influence in Southern Africa (and especially Angola) directed the defensive program against the threat posed by the classical chemical offensive potential of the East Bloc military doctrine. The project in those days was driven by the needs of active conventional military involvement.

However the situation in the 1990's is very different. South Africa is no longer involved in a conventional conflict and the Soviet/Cuban influence in Southern Africa is vastly diminished if not non-existent. East Bloc desire/ability to arm local conflicts has significantly decreased.

The South African political situation is in a state of change. The entire defence industry has entered a period of rationalisation. Reduced defence expenditure dictates that strict motivation and prioritization must be applied to all development projects.

South Africa is on the verge of preacceptance into the international community, with a variety of responsibilities pending.

In the light of these developments, it is necessary for us to re-evaluate the direction of our defensive CBW project, and to ensure that effort and money is being spent in areas that are necessary, and that offer useful abilities and solutions to our security forces' needs.

There are a number of international trends/happenings of which we should be aware, and which should be used to direct our planning.

The traditional international CBW threat scenario consisting mainly of superpower controlled stockpiles coupled to either NATO or Warsaw Pact doctrine, has been replaced by a far more dangerous threat. Interest in CBW by Third World and developing countries has led to a more diffuse threat that is difficult to monitor, and which has appeared in many regional conflicts in forms far removed from our traditional understanding of CBW.

South Africa is entering a period in history where we stand to emerge as a regional, if not continental power, and military trends to the north of us are likely to become of increasing importance to our own planning.

The appearance of more varied and effective delivery systems (including the chemically armed ballistic missile) has allowed a re-evaluation of the role and effectiveness of chemical weapons on the modern battlefield. This effectiveness was tragically demonstrated during the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq. Ballistic missiles have enabled chemical weapons to take their place amongst weapons that can be used to terrorise the cities of nations, and be used to counter suspected nuclear threats.

The spread of CBW technology in the developing world, and the availability of free-market expertise (ex East Bloc scientists) has increased the international threat of terrorist groups acquiring and using Chemical and Biological weapons.

CBW has been taken seriously enough by the international community for an attempt to be made to rid the world permanently of the threat. A new Chemical Weapons Convention was tabled for signing by the nations of the world in Paris in January 1993.

A question that needs to be asked by all nations is how this convention will affect defensive CBW needs:

Can it control the threat to such an extent that CBW defence will become unnecessary?

What technological demands will be made on signatory countries to allow compliance with the Convention requirements?

What are the implications for countries who either decide to sign or not to sign the Convention? This has to be assessed from a political, economic and military point of view.

It is evident from the above discussion that intelligent decisions on defensive CBW research and development today are inextricably linked to an understanding of international events and trends. This can then be applied to own circumstances to determine local requirements. However the sensitivity with which this subject is usually treated, as well as South Africa's long standing isolation from the international community, has made this type of information exceptionally difficult to come by.

#### Nuclear Research Training Courses To Be Held in 1994

*MB0605190193 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1656 GMT 6 May 93*

[Text] Pretoria May 6 SAPA—South Africa will host a training course early next year on the safe handling of radio-active waste following the first participation of this country in the deliberations of the technical working group meeting of the African regional co-operative agreement for research, development and training related to nuclear science and technology (AFRA).

The Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa (AEC) said in a statement on Thursday the availability of an advanced level of waste management in the country, as well as the infrastructure around the Vaal puts [as received] waste repository, presented an excellent base for the course.

South Africa will also host two other courses—a training course in nuclear instrumentation early next year, and a course on research reactor technologies in April and May, 1994.

AEC said the entry into AFRA represented a first for South Africa. It served as a meeting ground where communal projects could be discussed and also provided the opportunity for a sharing of resources.

"The aim is to extend the technological base more widely through Africa to the benefit of all its member countries and peoples. In this South Africa can play a leading role and has already been recognised by the rest of Africa as a leader in the nuclear field." South Africa will host the 1995 AFRA technical working group meeting and will serve as chairman of AFRA for that year.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### South Pacific Forum Warns France Against Restarting Nuclear Tests

BK0605123293 Hong Kong AFP in English 1011 GMT  
6 May 93

[Text] Suva, May 6 (AFP)—France was warned Thursday by the South Pacific Forum that its improved relations with island countries would be harmed if nuclear testing was resumed at its Mururoa Atoll facility in the South Pacific.

Acting forum Secretary General William Sutherland was commenting on reports that defence officials in both France and the United States had urged their respective governments to re-start testing. France declared a 12-month moratorium on testing last year in an effort to encourage Russia not to resume its weapons program.

But the moratorium was conditional on the U.S. and China also halting their test programs.

The 15-member South Pacific Forum meeting held at the Solomon Islands' capital Honiara last July welcomed France's nuclear test moratorium.

"The leaders also noted that any resumption would disappoint forum members and set back the current positive trend in improved relations between France and the forum," Sutherland said in a statement.

He said that the opinions of defence officials in France and the U.S. were not necessarily shared by their governments.

"We very much hope that wise counsel will prevail and that neither France nor the United States will recommence nuclear testing," Sutherland said.

Speculation that France could again start underground nuclear test explosions in the South Pacific was fueled by the recent election in Paris of a conservative government.

The Clinton administration in Washington is also under pressure to continue nuclear testing.

Russia has so far maintained its test moratorium.

The South Pacific Forum groups Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa.

## JAPAN

### Cooperation Pledged in Talks With U.S. on Proliferation

OW0405060793 Tokyo KYODO in English 0538 GMT  
4 May 93

[Text] Washington, May 3 KYODO—The United States and Japan have agreed to hold regular meetings to

discuss proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, a senior U.S. official said Monday [3 May].

They said [as received] the agreement for biannual meetings was reached late last month when a group of U.S. officials visited Japan for talks with Japanese Government officials.

The officials were from the U.S. Government departments of state, defense, energy and commerce.

Weapons proliferation is likely to be on the agenda of the July 7 to 9 Tokyo summit of seven major industrialized nations, the official said.

In the April meetings, the U.S. team urged Japan to review the contents of its Official Development Assistance (ODA).

It also called for tightening export restrictions on products that can be converted into weapons, such as semiconductors and personal computers, according to the official.

Concerning ODA, the U.S. official pointed out that some recipient nations, such as India and Pakistan, allegedly are involved in weapons proliferation, while issuing warnings that Iran is attempting to obtain nuclear weapons.

The U.S. side urged Japan to take leadership in the international community in preventing the proliferation of weapons.

Tokyo pledged to cooperate with Washington, the official said.

### Government To Agree to UN Move on DPRK

OW0705003493 Tokyo KYODO in English 0007 GMT  
7 May 93

[Text] Tokyo, May 7 KYODO—China will go along with a UN Security Council resolution asking North Korea to rescind its decision to quit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the YOMIURI SHIMBUN reported Friday [7 May].

The YOMIURI said in a dispatch from New York that the Security Council will vote on the resolution as early as Friday.

According to a draft of the proposed resolution, which the YOMIURI said it obtained, the Security Council is urging North Korea to reconsider its decision to leave the NPT and to honor an inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

North Korea's pullout from the NPT takes effect June 12.

The draft also says the Security Council will consider additional steps if Pyongyang refuses to take action to dispel suspicions about its nuclear program, the YOMIURI said.

## NORTH KOREA

### U.S. Said To Sell Arms to DPRK

*93WP0149A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 28 Apr 93 p 10*

[Article by Georgiy Bovt: "U.S. Arms Export Has Dropped: The United States Is Selling Arms to North Korea"]

[Text] According to U.S. Congress materials distributed yesterday, exports of American weapons through government channels dropped by 35 percent during the past fiscal year. But what has become a sensation in this report was the fact that the DPRK is among the countries importing American arms. This steep drop in U.S. arms exports is testimony to an objective shrinking of arms markets following the Cold War years, and at the same time it promises a sharper competition for them. This situation is being analyzed by Georgiy Bovt.

Under the United States Arms Export Control Act all such exports should be licensed by the Department of State. Traditionally, they have been viewed as an important factor of foreign policy with respect to the importing countries. But since the Cold War ended, conditions have obviously become unfavorable for expanding or even maintaining the previous level of arms sales. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the so-called "commercial export" of American-made arms during the past fiscal year also dropped, by as much as 59 percent (it should be mentioned that according to the State Department, only 40 to 60 percent of the "commercial" export permits are followed by signed contracts and factual supplies).

It is, of course, too early at least to talk about the United States "departure" from the market: The total sum of exports during the above mentioned period is near \$30 billion (compared to less than \$2 billion in Russian exports). But the very fact of decreased exports (we have also learned about a decrease in Pentagon military contracts for 1993, down from \$136 billion to \$121 billion) allows us to forecast intensified lobbying by the U.S. arms manufacturers in their attempts to make their government take some measures to restrict the freedom of action for other arms exporters. We may suggest that such measures will inevitably also touch upon the interests of Russian exporters who are trying to make 1993 "the year of radical change" and to restore the position of Russia in arms markets and who can compete with the United States in many directions.

As for the rather noticeable presence of North Korea among the importers—whose trade incidentally is still under a full embargo never lifted by the United States—it makes one entertain some rather different ideas. Washington is obviously trying to probe into the possibility of contacts with Pyongyang. The other day, a Department of State spokesman, Richard Boucher, admitted that the two countries were "maintaining a dialog" on the counselor level through their Beijing embassies. Their main subject is the DPRK's withdrawal

from the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms. Even though Boucher refuted the information of the DPRK president's spokesman about the alleged preparations for "summit talks," unofficial contacts seem to have already produced some results. Lately, for instance, two bits of information that contradict each other came simultaneously from the North Korean sources: A Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative in Pyongyang hinted that it might be possible to revise the decision on the withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (although the DPRK's UN representative refuted this information). In any case, the example of North Korea shows not only that American diplomacy has intensified its activity in areas where Russia left a "vacuum" by its departure, it also proves that arms export continues to be an important factor supporting such activity.

[Begin box]

### Countries Importing U.S. Equipment and Arms

In the 1992 fiscal year, the U.S. Department of State approved licenses for arms exports to the following countries (data provided by USIA):

South Korea—\$2.641 billion;  
Finland—\$2,427 billion;  
Turkey—\$1.852 billion;  
Saudi Arabia—\$0.974 billion;  
Egypt—\$0.860 billion;  
Greece—\$0.625 billion;  
United Arab Emirates—\$0.509 billion;  
Secret military supplies to government importers—  
\$1.012 billion.

The State Department also issued licenses for nongovernmental "commercial export" to a total of \$15.997 billion (which is 59 percent less than the preceding year).

Major importers in this division were:

Japan—\$2.1 billion;  
Germany—\$1.143 billion;  
Great Britain—\$1.02 billion;  
South Korea—\$0.904 billion;  
Mexico—\$0.701 billion;  
Turkey—\$0.659 billion;  
Israel—\$0.629 billion;  
Greece—\$0.598 billion;  
North Korea—\$0.589 billion;  
Australia—\$0.573 billion;  
Secret supplies—\$0.887 billion. [end box]

### Daily Denounces U.S. for Applying Double Standard

*SK0405111693 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
1029 GMT 4 May 93*

[“Double Standard Is Tool of Imperialists for Domination and Intervention”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, May 4 (KCNA)—The imperialists are applying two yardsticks, not one called international justice, interpreting and handling issues raised in international relations in their favour, and even trying to force their will upon others, says NODONG SINMUN

in a by-lined article today, adding this is aimed at gratifying their dominationist ambition by interfering in other's internal affairs.

Citing the United States' attitude on the DPRK's "nuclear problem" as a typical instance of the application of double standard, the article says:

The United States is persistently kicking up a row over fictitious "nuclear suspicion" against the DPRK as if it were an "international nuclear inspector".

If it intended to act according to one standard, it must admit and apologize for its moves of nuclear threat and not defend the nuclear program and development of nuclear weapons in South Korea, Japan, Israel and South Africa.

It is a product of the double standard employed by the United States that the International Atomic Energy Agency was compelled to "adopt" an unreasonable "resolution on special inspection" coercively, doubting the DPRK's honesty with regard to the nuclear problem only after its six rounds of inspection, although it had failed to "find" any evidence of nuclear weapons manufactured by South Africa through as many as 115 rounds of nuclear inspection of it.

The United States which has delivered offensive weapons of mass destruction and war equipment to its "allies" to cause international disputes is rather charging the DPRK with "proliferation of attack missiles", only fully revealing how unreasonable and shameless its double standard is. Should the double standard continue to be applied in the international arena, the article stresses, justice will be interpreted as injustice and vice versa, and then the principle of impartiality will cease to exist in international relations.

#### IAEA To Only Check Monitoring Equipment

SK0505132793 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network  
in Korean 1215 GMT 5 May 93

[Report by correspondent Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] is planning to send a three-member team to North Korea on 8 May in order to resume the ad hoc inspection [imsi sachal] which has been suspended since last February due to North Korea's refusal to grant visas to the inspection team.

It was learned that during the negotiations with North Korea, the IAEA proposed sending a five-member inspection team according to past practices. However, the North Korean side, unlike in the past, strongly demanded the reduction of the size of the inspection team. Because of this, the two sides reportedly reached a stumbling block in negotiations.

The current inspection team will not be able to conduct free inspection activities after going to Yongbyon, North Korea, but merely will engage in replacing the electric

power source and film installed in the existing monitoring equipment. Thus, the forthcoming inspection can hardly be termed as a normal inspection.

The issue of inspecting the replacement of plutonium fuel rods in the 5-megawatt experimental atomic reactor in Yongbyon is the pending problem between the IAEA and North Korea at present. However, the two sides did not discuss this pending issue during the recent negotiations.

Meanwhile, diplomatic sources in Vienna observed that North Korea's current issuance of visas to the inspection team is a diplomatic strategy designed for propaganda purposes in the face of the adoption of a resolution by the UN Security Council.

#### Further on Attempt To Recruit Urals Rocket Scientists

93WP0148A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 14, 2 Apr 93 p 9

[Article by Andrei Kolesnikov: "Russian Scientists Accused of Wanting To Help North Korea Become a Nuclear Power"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] The intended state aid to North Korea in developing rocket complexes has become these people's personal tragedy. They are sure: they have been betrayed by the state.

In December 1992 a group of specialists from the V.P. Makeyev engineering design office in Miass, Chelyabinsk Region, was detained at the border checkpoint of Sheremetyevo-2 Airport. Twenty staff members of the design office, Lenin and State Prize winners among them, together with their wives and children, made an attempt to leave for North Korea for work on a carrier-rocket codenamed Zyb.

After their detention the group waited for their lot to be decided for several weeks at a boarding house on the River Klyazma near Moscow. By the end of the second month of their "vacations" the whole world came to know about the rocket developers. From the rostrum of the 7th Congress of Russian People's Deputies Viktor Barannikov, Minister of Security, announced the detention of scientists who were going to turn North Korea into a nuclear power. Although the group's leadership insists that the Miass specialists have nothing in common with the production of nuclear weapons, it is clear that the design office's rockets can also carry nuclear warheads.

All the participants in this story have returned to Miass. They refuse to have any contacts with the press. Therefore hardly anything is yet known about the true reasons of their decision to leave for North Korea. There is even greater confusion about why the group was detained. The gravity of what happened has been further exacerbated by the latest developments: on March 12 the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and does not admit

foreign experts to the facilities where, presumably, work is underway on the development of the Korean atomic bomb.

Your correspondent has been able to meet two participants in the events.

#### **Reasons (professional)**

The V.P. Makeyev engineering design office is making submarine-launched missiles. Its personnel live in Mashgorodok, one of the three large districts of cold and clean, like all security regime townships, quiet provincial Miass.

Yuri Bessarabov, 52, with 30 years' seniority at the design office, an expert in the durability of constructions:

"I liked my work. But in recent years the military-industrial complex has started falling to pieces. The situation is being aggravated by the fact that we have always had a monopoly on one, fairly narrow direction which has now become unnecessary. Twenty-six persons have left the department with a staff of 100 during the past year. No new people have come. In the past 10-12 young specialists used to come to the department annually. Now one or two is a rarity."

#### **Reasons (ideological)**

No one would have even noticed if the group had left for France or America. But they had not been invited there. It is only infinitely naive or extremely cynical people that could go to North Korea, a country with a supertotalitarian, unpredictable regime. To all appearances, there were both among the group members.

Yuri Bessarabov:

"I gave my consent, apart from everything else, also because I saw this proposal as a high appraisal of my work. I believe that bad specialists would not be sent abroad."

Vladimir Usachev, 41, a specialist in the field of rudder drives:

"When I was offered to go to North Korea, I quickly gave my consent. From childhood we had been brought up in the spirit of internationalism in relation to it".

#### **Reasons (bearing on living conditions)**

Yuri Bessarabov:

"The average wage at our local dairy factory is 55,000 roubles. At our design office it is 6,000-8,000. I have always believed that our work is the most important, but it has turned out that we are unnecessary. Yet I have given 30 years to my enterprise, and it hurts me."

"So when I was offered a contract for work abroad at the end of 1992, I discussed this with my wife and agreed. We decided that such changes turn up once in life. That would be a good possibility to ensure my children and grandchildren, and to see the world".

"The contract presupposed work of a teaching type (I was offered 1,200 dollars a month for it), but did not rule out, it is true, other work, on a commercial basis. The details were not discussed, but there was talk about developing a small carrier which would put commercial communication satellites in orbit."

What happened after is still being discussed in undertones in Miass. They say that the "Koreans", as they are now called in the city, suffered from big time politics. By the latter people in Miass understand the behaviour of Igor Velichko, general designer of the design office.

#### **Contract**

The general designer enjoys no popularity at the design office. For Miass he is an outsider who came to the office after the death of his predecessor who, it was believed, could not in general be replaced by anyone.

Vladimir Usachev:

"An agreement on inviting the design office's specialist for cooperation in the DPRK was then endorsed at the corresponding department of the Ministry of General Machine Building and the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. I saw this agreement with my own eyes. The agreement envisaged that for the initial period of the group's work the design office would get three million US dollars. Moreover, the importance of our work, as we were told, was further accentuated by the fact that upon its completion the design office could receive an order from North Korea for the manufacture of the carrier which we would develop. In this way it turned out that we could become the saviours of the entire design office. At that time there was not even a question of any private trip."

The agreement was signed at the end of May of last year, and in late August-early September Velichko himself went to the DPRK. But on return to Miass he made a complete U-turn. Regrettably, Igor Velichko flatly refused to meet with me and I was unable to get first-hand information. What remains is versions.

#### **Out of bounds**

Under one, the least probable version Velichko renounced the trip proceeding from noble political considerations, if such considerations exist in general. They were linked to Russia's new policy as it were.

Under a different version, Igor Velichko was ordered to change his stand from Moscow. Under a third, Velichko hoped to get something from the contract himself but did not. For some reason many in Miass gravitate exactly to the latter version, even though it is more doubtful than the others.

Hearsay also ascribed to Igor Velichko the mechanism for blocking the trip. Not being able openly to turn back in sight of everyone, primarily in sight of the North Koreans, after the agreement had been signed, he organized a leakage of information by enlisting the services of a correspondent of one Western radio station who

specially came to Miass and announced on his return that North Korea was taking Russian specialists for the development of an atomic bomb. Our government naturally could not let the scandal go unnoticed, and the group's lot was thus sealed.

#### Departure

In the meantime the group was being prepared for departure. The rank-and-file members of the group did not suspect that their trip was becoming their personal, and fairly risky, undertaking.

Yuri Bessarabov:

"We received foreign passports. Newspapers later wrote that we had left on well-nigh counterfeited passports. That's rubbish. They were issued by the 1st Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And the fact that they were issued to us means that even in line with the nature of our occupations we had a right to go."

"A Security Ministry official later said that they had no claims either to us or to our documents. And all the claims boiled down to the fact that the passports had been issued and registered by two commercial firms. Thousands of people act in the same way as we did."

"We did not take any papers with us, being warned by the group's leadership about this, and we understood that we could not give the slightest possibility to find any fault with us. Everything had to be kept in our heads. I took with me solely reference books on higher mathematics and technical mechanics."

"We were detained after customs examination at the border checkpoint. They set our names on a computer, and the screen read: 'exit forbidden'. Right away the passports were taken away from the group and have not been returned to this day. We never made our way to the plane."

#### Leisure

All the group members still hoped that what had happened was a misunderstanding.

And when after the speech by Security Minister Viktor Barannikov at the 7th Congress of People's Deputies it became clear that the group would never be allowed to go anywhere, Security Ministry people bought the group members tickets to the special train "Yuzhny Ural" and even gave their bus to go to the train station. And they guaranteed return to the enterprise.

#### Return

This was a trying experience for everyone without exception. The group's leader, Lizin, got an infarction when still at the boarding house. Moreover, the "Koreans" were even met at home in different ways. With sympathy in the main, it is true. But they say that at one department they had tea with cake when seeing off their

"Korean", but when he came back they no longer looked at his face, stopped saying hallo and calling him on the phone.

Vladimir Usachev:

"I took my wife and 15-year-old daughter with me. Like myself my wife got her discharge when leaving. Were it not for the trip she would have continued working, of course. Right now her enterprise is gripped with mass layoffs... She is out of work today."

"For about a month I did not dare to return to the design office. I was hired by a department which now deals with a meat-packing complex in the framework of conversion.

"Of our entire group of 20 persons—specialists in ballistic, aerodynamics and durability—another four have returned to the design office. Whoever held leading positions were taken back with a demotion. All the rest have either got jobs at other enterprises in the city or are out of work in general."

The other day the group got together again in almost its entire composition. They tried to observe total secrecy, but it is difficult to conceal anything in Miass. The rumour had it that after the information about the group's detention became known for the whole world another two proposals to go away in search of a living were received, this time from European countries, and the group's leadership were now engaged in intensive negotiations. And for this reason many "Koreans" are not in a hurry to reinstate themselves in their previous jobs—they are sure that the sole purpose of taking them back is to keep them under tight control.

#### SOUTH KOREA

#### Government Outlines Plan for Solving DPRK Issue

SK0505033493 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean  
5 May 93 p 2

[Text] The government has decided to adopt a three-way method to urge North Korea to reverse its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. They will support international sanctions through the UN Security Council, support U.S.-North Korean high-level contacts, and initiate direct contacts with North Korea within this month. Based on the stance that it is not desirable to incite North Korea, the government has decided to try to persuade North Korea by using the card that "North Korea should first reverse its NPT withdrawal, and then it should accept the special inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

A government official said: The final goal demanded by our government, the United States, and international society is to block North Korea from developing nuclear weapons through the IAEA's special inspections. It is more urgent to make North Korea reverse its NPT withdrawal. He added: Our government is negotiating with relevant countries a method for having North Korea reverse its NPT withdrawal and accepting IAEA special inspections.

**POLAND****Israeli Firms Give Arms Presentation**

*LD0405181393 Warsaw PAP in English 1739 GMT  
4 May 93*

[Text] Warsaw, May 4—Representatives of ten Israeli firms on Tuesday started a two-day presentation of a wide offer of the Israeli arms industry.

Today's video display of Israeli-made air force equipment was attended by representatives of the Polish Defence Ministry, military research centres and the Polish arms industry.

The seminar was organized following a visit paid to Poland by Israeli Deputy Defence Minister Nathan Sharoni two months ago, during which the sides announced plans to sign an agreement on joint production of military equipment, including tanks.

## INDIA

### Director of Atomic Research Center Appointed

*BK0405145893 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 1430 GMT 4 May 93*

[Text] Mr. A.N. Prasad has been appointed director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center [BARC]. He is presently purchasing director of the fuel reprocessing and nuclear waste management group in BARC.

### Alloy Casting for Launch Vehicle Developed

*93WP0133A Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Mar 93 p 4*

[Text] Bangalore, March 5. A high-pressure aluminium alloy elbow casting for use in the liquid propulsion second stage engine of the Indian Space Research Organisation's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) has been indigenously developed by the liquid propulsion systems centre of the ISRO in collaboration with the Regional Research Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram.

The castings, composed of aluminium, silicon and magnesium, are used as inlets for fuel and oxidiser in the turbo pump of the engine.

The alloy has a very high specific strength and good shock-resistance. The development involved stringent control of the alloy composition, intricate pattern design, design of the feeding system, optimisation of the foundry process parameters, standardisation of heat treatment cycles and high pressure testing of the castings.

## IRAN

### Parliament Approves 'Immense' Nuclear Program

*93AS0773Y London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Apr 93 p 1*

[Article: "Iranian Parliament Approves Development of Nuclear Program in Cooperation With Russia, China, and North Korea"]

[Text] Tehran, London—Yesterday, Iran's parliament approved an immense nuclear development program, despite world fears of the possibility that Iran will use it for military purposes.

The Iranian program, whose costs are estimated at \$2.2 billion, calls for the construction of no less than four nuclear plants with the technical assistance of Russia, China, and North Korea. It is expected that the project for the four plants will increase Iran's electric power production by 1,200 megawatts.

The program also seeks to set up two research centers and to modernize and expand two other centers. Hundreds of Iranian nuclear scientists will be trained in the three countries contributing to the program.

The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna has expressed its fears that it is possible Iran will employ the program for military purposes also. The agency has expressed fears of the Iranian-North Korean cooperation in this area. As soon as the current projects are completed, Iran will be able to produce enough enriched uranium to produce a number of nuclear bombs.

Iran has repeatedly denied that it plans to develop nuclear capabilities for military purposes. Iranian leaders point out that Iran wishes to acquire the technologies necessary to develop nuclear weapons, but it will not develop such weapons unless they are developed by another country in the region first.

Inauguration of the Iranian nuclear program comes in the wake of leaked reports that Iran is in the process of developing a ballistic missiles system with the assistance of North Korea. Medium- and long-range missiles under development will be able to carry nuclear heads for a distance of 1,100 km, according to Western experts.

## IRAQ

### UN Team Says 'Basic Elements' of Nuclear Program Destroyed

*NC0405153193 Paris AFP in English 1505 GMT 4 May 93*

[Text] Baghdad, May 4 (AFP)—Iraq's nuclear weapons program has largely been destroyed but too little is known about its suppliers to guarantee the program will not be rebuilt, a U.N. arms expert said here Tuesday [4 May].

"The major components of their program are reasonably well mapped and the basic elements are destroyed," according to Richard Hooper, the head of a 14-member U.N. team visiting Iraq.

"Certainly under any kind of monitoring program as it is currently envisioned, it will certainly be difficult for them to reconstitute their program," he told AFP.

But Iraq has not told the United Nations all it needs to know about how and where it obtained nuclear technology, he added. "Certainly to know that procurement network in detail is important for the long-term monitoring."

Iraq's nuclear centers were destroyed during the 1991 Gulf War or dismantled during the 19 U.N. nuclear inspection visits since the conflict, he said.

The centers included al-Qa'im, 450 kilometers (270 miles) west of Baghdad, al-Jazirah and al-Sharqat, near Mosul, 400 kilometers (240 miles) north of Baghdad, and near the capital, Tarmiya, al-Athir and Tuwaytha.

**RUSSIA****Committee Member Bolotin Views Brain Drain**

*93WP0145A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 9, 20 Apr 93 p 6*

[Article by Veronika Romanenkova: "We Suffer Not Only From Brain Drain, But Also From Brain Dry-Up"]

[Text] A mission from Singapore has visited Moscow for the purpose of selecting scientists from Russia and other CIS countries who wish to work in that country. Of 350 candidates, 80 were selected for the "second round."

Singapore is only one of the countries currently taking advantage of the opportunity to recruit our highly skilled professionals, the demand for whom certainly is not limited to the Third World. And it does not cost all that much. According to the Russian National Committee on the Problem of "Brain Drain," an emigre scientist's pay in the West is four times lower, and that of a Russian scientist working "on site" on a foreign contract—60 times lower than that of a foreign specialist of the same specialization and qualifications.

Although there are considerable concerns in the West that a mass influx of emigres from Russia may lead to an emergence in the scientific community of a stratum with different cultural values, our specialists are welcomed. The Council on Competitiveness, which brings together chief executive officers of 151 U.S. corporations, believes that by 2010 the United States will be 500,000 scientists and engineers short. Hence, one may assume that specialists in electronics, information science, and in the area of natural science and fundamental research, as well as members of other modern professions will attract first and foremost the attention of the U.S. immigration services. An active policy of attracting Russian scientists has been launched by Japan, which clearly believes itself a latecomer at the division of the Russian "scientific pie." It shows particular interest in programmers and computer scientists.

Among the Russian science branches especially affected by the scientists' migration, mathematics and computer technology stand out. Naturally, young people are in great demand in the West. All in all, 9,200 Russian scientists left for foreign countries in 1992. These data, the analysis of the situation, and the options for regulating the outflow of skilled manpower from domestic science are presented in the report to the president of Russia, prepared by the specialists of the Russian National Committee on the Problem of "Brain Drain."

"Studying the 'brain drain', and consequently moving to concrete actions on this problem are complicated by the fact that the process itself is very heterogeneous and cannot be reduced to a common denominator," believes committee member Ivan Bolotin. "It is hard to come to an unequivocal conclusion whether the 'brain drain' is dangerous or not. On one hand, if the number of scientists falls to the 'critical mass' level—a million people—Russia will face the threat of a degradation of the nation and other catastrophic consequences. On the

other hand, it is enough for one or two leading scientists to leave for many schools in science to cease to exist."

The USSR used to have 1.5 million scientists and teaching scientists (in the United States there are 2.73 million). Between 1975 and 1988, the proportional share of the USSR science professionals in the world scientific community fell from 24 percent to 19 percent, while the share of their U.S. colleagues increased from 23 percent to 34 percent. After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia's share amounted to more than 900,000 scientists and teaching scientists. However, their number currently not only is not increasing, but it is actually declining.

Of considerable concern to specialists is the recent trend toward the so-called "brain dry-up"—scientists moving into commercial structures. After all, no more than two percent of the total personnel outflow from the sphere of science migrated abroad in 1992. By existing estimates, for each researcher who has left the country, there are 10 who have stayed but have left the field of science in search of better-paying jobs.

Ivan Bolotin is convinced that it is impossible to stem these processes.

**Team Starts Ecological Study of Planned CW Destruction Site**

*PM0405130793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Apr 93 First Edition p 2*

[Unattributed report under the general heading "News Agency Reports"]

[Text] The departmental commission headed by Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems, has begun work in Chuvashia.

Its task is to conduct a state ecological expert study in the 30km zone around the "Khimprom" Production Association in Cheboksary where the Russian Government plans to build a chemical weapons destruction facility.

**ARMENIA****Commission To Oversee Control of Nuclear, Other Weapons**

*NC0405151193 Yerevan SNARK in English 1004 GMT 4 May 93*

[Text] Yerevan, 4 Apr (SNARK)—The Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan has signed the decree on control of the export of the raw, equipment, technology, science and technical information and services which are of great importance for Armenia and which are being applied in military machines and ammunition production. Those of peaceful importance should also be under the control, especially such raw, equipment, technology, information and services which can be used in nuclear, chemical, missiles and other weapons production.

In accordance with the decree there will be created the Commission on Export Control which will be headed by the Armenian vice-premier. The commission will consist

of head of the Armenian State Department on National Security and the first deputy of the head of the Armenian Military and Industrial Commission. The decree says that the idea on commission creation is connected with the intentions to fulfill the international obligations on non-spreading the weapons of mass destruction and other kinds of weapons.

## ESTONIA

### Ukraine Treaty, Bacteriological Ban Ratified

*LD0605120793 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network  
in Estonian 1700 GMT 5 May 93*

[Excerpt] The Riigikogu worked a long time today. Today the cooperation and friendship treaty between the Republic of Estonia and Ukraine was ratified, as well as the convention on exchanging official publications and government documents between countries, and the law, presented by the government, on joining the convention on the ban on improving, producing, and procuring bacteriological and toxic weapons and the destruction thereof. [passage omitted]

## KAZAKHSTAN

### Almaty Protesters Demand End of PRC Nuclear Tests

*OW0605034493 Moscow Ostankino Television First  
Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1845 GMT  
4 May 93*

[Video report by A. Nugmanova from Almaty; from the "Utro" program]

[Text] What do we live for? What will we leave our descendants? One can no longer give a simple answer to these questions. A meeting and protest march organized by activists of the popular headquarters of the anti-nuclear movement was held in Almaty. In the square by Parliament House they displayed slogans protesting continued testing of mass destruction weapons at the Lop Nur test range in China. [video shows small crowd of people with banners and onlookers] The radioactive fallout from 10 years of explosions carries a serious danger and has a pernicious effect on the health of people not only in China, but in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics as well. After all, we are neighbors. [video shows A. Asylbekov, head of the peace march, speaking loudly to Nugmanova]

[Begin recording] [Asylbekov] We wish and, in fact, we struggle for the life of all mankind's descendants. With this in mind, we have undertaken this peace march and we undertook a haj to Mecca, the holy place of all eastern Muslims, where we made a prayerful vow in honor of all those who have perished from nuclear disasters—Semipalatinsk, Lop Nur, Nevada in the United States, France, and Great Britain. Kazakhstan, which was the first to close down the imperial nuclear test site on its territory, is now undertaking a peace march aimed at

closing down all test sites. [video cuts to show A. Akimbek, not further identified, speaking in front of Parliament House]

[Akimbek] Remember the end of May last year, when the Chinese militarists carried out an enormously powerful explosion of one and a half megatons on 21 May? This is equivalent to 100 Hiroshimas. Can you imagine it? Today, when we demand the closing down of the Lop Nur test range, we are not interfering in China's internal affairs because radiation does not choose borders. It does not distinguish whether you are Chinese, Russian, Kazakh, or Uygur. We are all subject to radiation danger. [end recording] [video shows demonstrators in front of a building flying the PRC flag and a PRC crest over the door]

A statement appealing for measures to end nuclear testing for the benefit of all people was presented to the PRC Embassy in Kazakhstan. The Semipalatinsk test range is closed, but grim consequences remain, and regardless of the measures we undertake, they will always be insufficient.

## UKRAINE

### Commentary Says Nuclear Weapons Threaten Planet

*LD0605215793 Moscow Ostankino Television First  
Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 6 May 93*

[Commentary by Aleksandr Gerasimov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] Russia has called on Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other countries of the CIS to rapidly accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is stated in a working document presented by our state to the United Nations. Russia considers that one of the priorities of multilateral disarmament should be the consistent fulfillment of accords which have already been achieved. By the way, not everything is going well in this respect. [video shows mobile nuclear missiles, launch facilities, Ukrainian parliament and officials] [passage omitted]

Statements made two years ago by the newly independent Ukraine about the republic's nuclear-free status are taking on an increasingly eroded appearance. The idea is now going the rounds that if Ukraine gives up the strategic missiles it will no longer be taken into account and it will fall into the rank of third-ranking countries with the corresponding economic and political consequences.

A number of influential parties and movements have already worked out a program for turning Ukraine into a real nuclear power, from setting up their own nuclear forces command to retargeting the missiles according to the principle of "security in all directions." Moreover, military specialists say that technically this task is quite feasible.

At the present time, all of the 1,250 nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine are officially considered to be

Russian and are operationally subordinated to Russia, although in effect this subordination is purely formal and [Ukrainian] President Kravchuk has even been given the right and possibility of forbidding the launch of missiles. Moscow generals assert that the Ukrainian military administration puts all sorts of obstacles in the way of Russian specialists to prevent them from gaining access to launch installations, thus leaving the missiles without the necessary inspection.

The chief of staff of the strategic missile forces considers that no one can today guarantee the complete safety of the nuclear missiles in Ukraine. So, Kiev's political arguments are being paid for by vast risks, not only to the citizens of that republic but perhaps of the whole planet.

### **Rukh Chairman 'Absolutely Against' Total Missile Transfer**

*AU0605100093 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG  
in German 3 May 93 p 8*

[Interview with Vyacheslav Chornovil, chairman of the Ukrainian Rukh movement, by Manfred Quiring; place and date not given: "Will Ukraine Become a De Jure Nuclear State?"]

[Text] [Quiring] How do you assess the prospects for the final ratification of the START I Treaty and the Non-proliferation Treaty by the Ukrainian Parliament?

[Chornovil] I think that we will ratify START, and I am all for it. However, there are a number of conditions. First, we demand security guarantees from Russia. Even though we have convinced ourselves that we do not have any potential enemies, when Russia's Vice President Rutskoy and the Parliament make territorial claims on Ukraine, there must be something.

Therefore, we expect guarantees and material compensation. Compensation only means securing disassembly, which is very expensive. We are expected to transport all the warheads to Russia and that is it. But what does one do with the missiles with liquid fuel, with the launch chutes, and the people who operate all that? They, too, must receive social safeguards if they are to be unemployed in the future. Ecological problems also play a serious role. Only when all this is clarified may START I be ratified.

However, this does not exhaust Ukraine's nuclear potential. There remain 46 missiles, and I am absolutely against transferring them to Russia. One need not be hypocritical. We are a de facto nuclear state, we must declare ourselves as such as a matter of law. This would be a clear gesture that we are the first nuclear state to express its intention to free itself from nuclear weapons.

[Quiring] Actually, Ukraine itself cannot really dispose of its nuclear missiles.

[Chornovil] This is claimed, but it is wrong. First, they are on our territory. Second, we have certain administrative control. In a decree Colonel General Konstantin Morosov, the Ukrainian defense minister, obliged the 43d Missile Army, which is stationed in Ukraine, to

swear an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. Therefore, this army is subject to Ukrainian control to a certain extent. In addition, there are technical possibilities to prevent a sudden missile launch.

[Quiring] How were your views received during your visits to the United States and Great Britain?

[Chornovil] The main thing for the United States is that there are no missiles aimed at its territory. Unfortunately, in the United States there is something that I would call democratic imperialism.

It considers Ukraine still to be a zone of Russia's strategic interests. We are expected simply to raise our hands. Both the United States and Russia want that.

I have asked for more consideration to be shown toward those states that are located in the "buffer zone" between Russia and the Western world.

[Quiring] What could the United States do to support Ukraine in overcoming its economic crisis and what can it not do?

[Chornovil] It cannot implement the reforms for us or work for us. We ourselves must forge our happiness. Nevertheless, we must think about aid in the form of loans. We must compensate for the deteriorating living conditions. If we had been given loans for the purchase of the necessary foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals, we would have had fewer political difficulties. Today dissatisfaction is very strong, and the people link the current scarcity of goods with the fact that we have become an independent state.

Loans, investment, economic cooperation—these are the important factors. The United States is implementing them to a minimum degree. Washington can support the democratic forces quietly via various funds but certainly not by direct pressure.

[Quiring] How important are Ukrainian-Russian relations for you? How can they be normalized?

[Chornovil] We need normal relations with Russia. One need not have come up with the CIS, since normal bilateral relations with Russia would have been sufficient. Then the current blackmails and economic traps would not exist. I am worried by the constant statements by Prime Minister Kuchma about the resumption of relations with Russia, from which we depend on 60 percent. Unfortunately, the government is not making any attempt to break out of this dependence or to reorient Ukraine's economy.

In addition, Ukraine must look for contacts with Russian democratic forces. We have gradually lost them all.

### Council Votes To Abide by 1980 Nuclear Materials Convention

*LD0505201893 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 5 May 93*

[Text] The 1980 convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials is to be considered obligatory for Ukraine, as one of the legal successor states of the former Soviet Union.

This was the decision adopted by the Supreme Council session at its evening plenary session. It had been proposed by the Ukrainian president. During the discussion, it was stressed that this convention regulated the efforts of almost 100 states in counteracting criminal actions that encroach upon the rights of and can result in considerable damage to people, their property, and the environment.

Ukraine's participation in the convention and the fulfillment of its requirements will raise radiation safety levels at Ukraine's nuclear facilities and will promote intensive measures to ensure the safekeeping of nuclear material.

The session also adopted the draft law on Ukraine's international agreements at its first reading.

### Party Urges State To Become Full Nuclear Power

*MK0605124693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 May 93 p 3*

[Vladimir Skachko report under "Ukraine" rubric: "Republicans Favor Nuclear Ukraine. 'We Have Torn Moscow Away From the Ukrainian Nipple and Have Started To Get Mastitis'"]

[Text] The fourth congress of the new Ukraine's oldest political party—the Ukrainian Republican Party—has taken place. In his report Ukrainian People's Deputy Mikhail Goryn stated, commenting on the results of Ukraine's acquisition of independence: "Reality has exceeded the most pessimistic forecasts. The economic crisis is deepening, the living standard is falling unrestrainedly, and the number of paupers is increasing. In hospitals there are not enough medicines for sick children, and in schools there are not enough textbooks. The army is using an alien language, the Black Sea Fleet obeys the orders of Russian admirals. Like mushrooms after rain political parties propagandizing the wrenching of certain territories from Ukraine are growing. And on top of all this is an orgy of crime, with the law enforcement organs powerless. Ukraine is in dire straits, the profound administration crisis paralyzing its will." Presidential adviser Bogdan Ternopilskiy, one of the party's leaders, said: "We have torn Moscow away from the Ukrainian nipple and have started to get mastitis." He received stormy applause.

Despite attempts to find a foreign enemy to excuse internal disorders, however, most congress decisions

concerned domestic problems. In the economics sphere the Republicans are advocating the acceleration of reforms and a structural perestroyka in the economy. In their opinion, changes for the better can be achieved by overcoming the fuel and energy dependence on Russian power sources and the population's psychological unpreparedness for difficulties. The first must be solved by finding alternative oil and sources and by drawing up a large-scale energy conservation program, the second by accelerating unpaid privatization.

The Ukrainian Republican Party has once again come out as a pro-presidential party. The Republicans have criticized Leonid Kravchuk for handing over tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, flirting with the CIS, for what is in their opinion an incorrect cadre policy, and the Yalta-Dagomys process, but Goryn stated that if necessary to confirm real statehood, the Ukrainian Republican Party will come out in support of direct presidential rule.

Kuchma's government has been criticized for lacking a program of reforms and radical reformist steps, for its inability to "launch" reforms and become a cabinet of like minds. At the same time the Ukrainian Republican Party has stated that it will support the granting of extraordinary powers to the government and will advocate the formation of a government of professional reformers without the Supreme Soviet's participation.

The most flak has been taken by parliament, whose hostages, in the congress' opinion, both President Kravchuk and the government have become—which to the old nomenklatura's advantage is blocking all progressive decisions. Therefore the Republicans, having declared the current system of soviets ineffective, advocated a radical reorganization of the representative branch and elections to parliament on a multiparty basis. The new Ukrainian Constitution, in the congress' opinion, must be adopted by a Constitutional Assembly and not the Supreme Soviet, as the existing constitution states.

But the Ukrainian Republican Party's position on nuclear weapons was most radical. In the opinion of its members, Ukraine now faces a choice: To be a strong European state or a "beet republic." The Ukrainian Republican Party therefore advocated Ukraine's recognition as a de facto nuclear state, which will participate in nuclear disarmament not unilaterally but with all the world's states. Until a collective security system and a global nuclear disarmament program have been created, the Ukrainian Republican Party proposes the following: To take full control of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory; to create a Ukrainian command of strategic nuclear troops; to devise its own system of nuclear warning; to re-aim nuclear weapons according to the principle of "security in all directions"; and to provide Kravchuk with not only a control button, but also a launch button.

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